177 have brought to their customs rather than truly adhere to them. This
183 passive attitude is due to an inveterate fatalism which makes them
563 bow before the undisputed master, the Mututsi, and also to the antiquity of custom which makes it as respectable as an almost divine institution.

671 As is the case in the Belgian Congo and generally in [5] Black Africa, the common law contains not only juridical rules applicable to persons, property, and society, it also contains religious and magic regulations, various recipes, etc. Such as it is, it forms a disparate yet solid whole which gives the solution to problems arising from the individual and collective life of the Banyarwanda.

671 The common law of Ruanda, applicable to a homogeneous
184 population, is the same everywhere, except in the north on the
563 frontier of Kivu and Uganda, where the authority of the Batutsi over the Bahutu could not assert itself as in the rest of the country. This independence has resulted in the substitution of the administration of the Bahutu clan and family chiefs for that of the Hamite officials.

114 Those who have known Ruanda and its people best are the members of the Society of Missionary Fathers of Africa. The Reverend Fathers Lupias, Schumacher, Arnoux, Pagès, and Hurel have published, in the Anthropos and Congo reviews (among others) and in numerous monographs, elaborate studies on different aspects of the social, political, religious, and intellectual life of the Banyarwanda. The territorial governors Lenaerts and Sandrart have also brought fruitful contributions to the knowledge of Ruanda common law.

121 Nevertheless, we do not believe that a more or less complete account of the customs of private and public law of Ruanda has ever been prepared. This is what we have modestly attempted to do in the [125] present work by inserting observations gathered in a questionnaire set up especially to facilitate [6] the study of native law (1). We have

1. J. Vanhove, Questionnaire de Sociologie juridique, Brussels, printer Lesigne, 1939.

not been able to go into the details of all the institutions of which some, particularly those relative to cattle contracts, would alone require a whole volume.

124 But, in spite of the limited time we could devote to this account of the customs, we believe we have given the essential points

124 [115] of the complex customs of Ruanda. The value of our information, emanating from the principal abiru, guardians of the customs of the Court of Nyanza, and from the seminarists, sons of the great provincial chiefs, as well as the cross-checking we have done, make us hope that we will present an essay from which all fantasy has been eliminated.

● 121 We hope that it will be possible for all those, both clerical and lay, who work in the "country of the cow and the drum," as well as ethnologists needing a basis for research, to have a clear picture of an organization, of a mechanism both complicated and precise, that takes us back mutatis mutandis both to the atmosphere of the ancient City and to that of the medieval world. [7]

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

THE KINGDOM OF RUANDA

By J. J. MAQUET

121 THE world-view of a people refers to a kind of reality which is not directly observable. We can observe things and behaviour, but not ideas or mental attitudes. These have to be inferred. Furthermore, although the concepts and propositions which make up the world-view of the Banyarwanda[1] are all arrived at by induction, they do not possess the same logical status. They are located, so to speak, on different levels of abstraction. Some are arrived at by immediate inference from observation, as when we say, for instance, that for Banyarwanda 'the invisible world is a fearful reality'. This statement may be immediately inferred from the behaviour of the Ruanda people: their words, when they tell us their beliefs about the action of the spirits of the dead, and their behaviour if they are threatened by them. On the other hand, a statement such as 'strictly contractual relationships are inconceivable for a Munyarwanda' is much more abstract because it is reached by successive stages from an analysis of the political organization of Ruanda. The validity of the two kinds of statement is not necessarily affected by their degree of abstraction. Even a proposition which seems very far removed from its factual foundation may be checked by the observation of other relevant facts.

Ideas concerning the place of man in the world, his destiny, his main values, his attitudes in relation to his fellow men, the rules of his behaviour, and the meaning of the invisible world, may find expression in many kinds of social phenomena. However, as might be expected, some of these phenomena are particularly significant, as, for instance, folk-tales concerning the creation of the world and the arrival of the Batutsi in the country, proverbs, and forms of cult. To these special attention has been given.

The validity of an unstated cultural premiss will, of course, be established with more certainty if it is found implied in several and very different cultural phenomena. For instance, an analysis of the political structure may lead to the discovery of the principle of the fundamental inequality of the three castes of ancient Ruanda. The same principle is also implied in tales explaining the origin of the three groups and the sources of their social roles.

121 177 This study refers to the period when the Ruanda cult had not yet been subjected to the impact of Western culture. This is not very far back in time, for it seems that the first white man to be seen in Ruanda was Count von Götzen, who travelled through the country with a German scientific-military expedition in 1894. The first permanent occupation of the country was not more than fifty years ago, and important changes in the culture have

[1] The inhabitants of Ruanda.

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

been brought only during the past thirty years. The present Ruanda culture has lost the coherence that existed in pre-European days. Those who have become more closely associated with alien activity, and have therefore felt its influence more constantly, now share a culture made up in part of their ancestral way of life and in part of their interpretation of the Belgian variety of Western culture as it operates in a colonial situation. Even those who have not been brought into direct contact with whites feel that their old patterns of life are losing their validity. But that more or less hidden part of the old culture, consisting of basic assumptions on the relationships of man with the world and with other men, has suffered the least change. To be sure, the legends of the descent of the first Batutsi meet with more scepticism than in the past, but the fundamental beliefs that this story reflects are still profoundly embedded in the Ruanda ethos. Even when new institutions, based on assumptions conflicting with the earlier ones, are imposed under external pressure and adopted, the principles shaping the older institutions will subsist and, if participation in the new institutions is unchecked, these will be completely reinterpreted in accordance with the former premises. Some manifestations of the continuing existence of the ancient assumptions in the contemporary context will be considered here, but we shall be mainly concerned with the Ruanda world-view as it was at the beginning of this century.[1]

Ruanda is a highland country in East Africa lying in the region delimited by lakes Kivu, Victoria, and Tanganyika. Its area is 24,500 square kilometres; its population amounts to almost 2 million inhabitants, the highest density in Africa south of the Sahara. Three socio-'racial' castes are to be

[1] Much of the material used in this study was collected by the author during two years' work (1950–1) in Ruanda as a social anthropologist of the *Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale* (I.R.S.A.C.). The author was very much helped in his field research by Dr. E. Fineulat and Dr. G. De Clercq during their six-month course of training under his direction. Extensive and valuable information has been found in the published literature on Ruanda, especially studies by Father A. Arnoux, Abbé L. de Lacger, Abbé Alexis Kagame, the late Father A. Pagès, Mr. G. Sandrart, Father Schumacher, and Mr. J. Vanhove. The author is also grateful to the Abbé Kagame for having placed at his disposal some of his manuscripts. In formulating the conceptual and theoretical scheme used in this paper, the author has relied considerably on the teaching and works of Professor Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard University. He is immensely indebted for his fundamental training in anthropology to the teaching staff of London University and particularly to Professor Daryll Forde. Mr. Lawrence Oschinsky has kindly corrected the manuscript. A short bibliography is given at the end, but it has not been felt necessary to document this study at every point, nor indeed was this possible, since it was written in the field with the use of a very restricted library.

This is an essay in the etymological meaning of the word. If the underlying configurations of a culture constitute its most important part, since they provide a key to the interrelatedness of apparently unconnected phenomena and to the meaning of apparently incomprehensible behaviour, they are also the most elusive realities. They evade direct observation and, often, direct interrogation. The anthropologist, therefore, must be sure that his inferences are logically acceptable not only to his own mind but also to the minds of the participants in the culture he studies. All this requires a thorough knowledge of the overt aspects of a culture and a long familiarity with them. The author is painfully aware that he has not gone very deeply into the ethos of Ruanda. This is only an attempt at a synthesis of the results so far obtained in researches which are still proceeding.

000 "Herodotus," the same author goes on to say, "tells us that the Nasamon who lived in Tripolitania buried their dead in a crouching position. They took good care /58/ that a dying person, when about to give up the ghost, should be made to sit up and prevented from lying down...." (1)

1. Dr. Weisgerber, Les Blancs d'Afrique /The Whites of Africa/, pp. 309 and 310.

●121 Déchelette says that it is not possible to explain the origin of this custom of folding up the corpse. Several conjectures have been offered about it.

1. Identification of the corpse with a fetus (symbolic embryonic position). The deceased returns to the womb of the mother, who will bring him back to life (belief of the Peruvians and Hottentots).

2. Practice performed for practical reasons, so as to reduce the dimensions of the funeral container (or grave).

3. Feeling of terror which the dead inspired in the living (possible origin of the tying process) (2).

2. Joseph Déchelette, Manuel d'Archéologie prehistorique, celtique et gallo-romaine /Handbook of Prehistoric, Celtic, and Gallo-Roman Archeology/, Vol. 1, p. 473.

764 In some parts of Ruanda the relatives of the deceased, after preparing the grave, dig to one side and at the bottom of the pit a sort of chamber where the body is laid. They are obviously moved by respect for the dead whose body, thus placed, is not crushed by the weight of the earth.

Others cover the mortal remains with a layer of grass to prevent direct contact with the soil and to allay the weight [of the earth].

8: Hall G-5 (1929-31) 1938 FO42 Rundi FO42

THE STUDY OF NATIVE COURT RECORDS AS A METHOD OF ETHNOLOGICAL INQUIRY

R. DE Z. HALL

217 WHEREVER native courts have been established and maintain records of their proceedings, there is available a mass of material concerning native law and custom which, properly regarded, may be of great value to the ethnographer as well as to the administrator. In Tanganyika Territory, from one portion of which the material for the present paper is derived, the making of elaborate records of evidence and judgements is deprecated at the present stage of development, as likely to interfere with the smooth working of the courts. A minimum is required of the names of parties, a brief statement of the subject-matter, and a short judgement signed by the holder of the court, be he chief, headman, or chairman of a council. Under such
● 121 circumstances, a study of records will show, at the least, the types of
217 social maladjustment which bring people to court, with the relative frequency of different kinds of case: the manner in which different types of case are viewed by the court, whether as offences against society or as affecting only families or individuals: and probably some general indication of the tone of the society. From this type of record there will be an upward range to the most valuable of all for the student, those containing a précis of evidence and a full reasoned judgement.

Whatever the amount of material available, it can only provide a limited picture of native law. In most, possibly all, areas, large numbers of disputes never reach the courts at all, but are dealt with in family council or by village elders. Further, the courts are only resorted to when disequilibrium has come about, and it can seldom be safe to argue the positive from the negative. Nevertheless, generalizations should emerge, and even where they do not, lines of inquiry should be indicated and facts brought to light and explained, which might otherwise have remained obscured or not understood. Most important, it is likely that evidence of change will be found, either clearly stated or in the form of indications which will offer material for further study.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

INTRODUCTION

THE greater part of this work is directly concerned with the description and analysis of the political organization of Ruanda. The first chapters, however, are devoted to other aspects of the social system: kinship and affinity, marriage and family. As the whole system of social relations in Ruanda constituted a closely knit fabric, it was thought that an understanding of the political institutions necessitates also some treatment of the other structures of human relations. Moreover, a brief account of the physical environment, the quest for food, shelter, and health, and some demographic data have been included because these elements, if external to the pattern of political relations, set the limits within which the Ruanda system of domination grew.

This study refers to the period immediately preceding the time when Ruanda was submitted to the influence of Western culture through its European agents. That is to say, in the continuously moving historical stream, we have chosen to study the particular configuration of the Ruanda political organization at the moment when it had been moulded by the action of many forces, but not by the full impact of European contacts. For reasons mentioned later, the 'zero point' of direct European influence on Ruanda society is not difficult to assess. It is in the first decade of this century. Ruanda social structure did not undergo any significant modification due to European influence until roughly 1910. This date is fortunately not very distant, and around 1950 it was still possible to interview many people who had been young when the old régime was still a working concern. As far as we know, there had been also no direct and continuous contact between Arabs and Ruanda prior to that time.

To remind the reader that we are describing structures and institutions which no longer exist, at least in their entirety, my account is given in the past tense even when it refers to features which are still functioning today. The expressions 'today', 'now', 'at the present time', &c., refer to the period 1950–1 during which basic research was carried out in Ruanda.

As a social anthropologist of the *Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale*, I carried out field work in Ruanda

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

for two years, from December 1949 to November 1951. During that period information was secured by continuous observation and by informal interviews with Africans and Europeans. Some administrative officers and missionaries, keenly interested in the society and culture of the Ruanda, have contributed much information and stimulating opinions.

In addition to this work, three systematic inquiries on specific subjects have been completed: political organization, kinship and family structures, and cosmological and ethical systems. Each of these inquiries was prepared by a preliminary survey on the subject, on the basis of which schedules of topics and specific questions were framed.

The preliminary survey of political organization enabled me to collect a considerable amount of information on that subject. Consequently, a later inquiry could aim primarily at checking and making more precise what was already known. To achieve this purpose a hundred-question schedule was devised. It was the object of each question that it should fulfil as adequately as possible the following conditions: to be neutral (formulated in such a way as not to suggest that the investigator preferred one answer rather than another), significant (likely to clarify obscure or controversial issues), concrete (such as 'Were there more or less people in group A than in group B?') rather than abstract (such as 'Give a definition of the administrative organization'), and simple (to be answered by 'yes', 'no', or one word). This last requirement was particularly important as it made possible a summing up of the answers. A translation of this questionnaire is given as Appendix One.

The choice of informants was made according to the following procedure. About a dozen persons, Africans and Europeans, who had been living for many years in Ruanda and had been in close contact with many members of the African community, were asked to give a list of Ruanda (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa) who, in their opinion, would be familiar with the pre-European political structure, particularly from direct experience. The importance of listing people living in all the different regions of the country was stressed. By collating the various lists I finally obtained a set of about 350 names of men scattered everywhere in the country.

In order to interview them, I had to move between seventy-four different places which were about evenly distributed through the

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

orography of the country). They are due to the conjunction of these physical circumstances with the particular way in which the human occupation of the land has taken place.

2. HUMAN OCCUPATION

Several hypotheses have been advanced in attempts to reconstruct the history of the human occupations of Ruanda. We are not concerned with them here. Let us summarize only those features which are of significance for our purpose and which have a high degree of probability.

The present population of Ruanda is clearly composed of three groups: Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi. These groups are very unequal numerically. In the middle of 1956, according to a Government demographic survey, the Twa constituted 0·67 per cent. of the total Ruanda population, the Hutu 82·74 per cent., and the Tutsi 16·59 per cent.[5] Differences that are immediately noticeable between these groups concern their activities, their social statuses, and their physical types. The Twa are hunters, potters and iron-workers. Twa hunters are not numerous, as game is rare in most parts of Ruanda owing to the scarcity of forest. Some of them make a living as singers, dancers, and buffoons. The Hutu are agriculturists and the Tutsi pastoralists. The statuses of the three groups are hierarchically ranked. The Tutsi group constitutes an aristocracy, the Hutu are commoners, and the Twa are said, half jokingly, by most of the other Ruanda, to be more akin to monkeys than to human beings. A definite physical appearance is considered typical of each group. According to the socially accepted descriptions of the three stereotypes the typical Twa is short, pygmoid rather than pigmy, with a head low in the crown, face and nose flat, cheek-bones prominent, forehead bulging, eyes narrow and slightly oblique. Hutu characteristics are woolly hair, flat broad nose, thick lips often everted, and middle stature. Tutsi are very slender and tall. They often have a straight nose and a light brown skin colour. The objective measurements of Professor Jean Hiernaux do not entirely coincide with these stereotypes.[6]

[5] These figures have been kindly communicated by Mr. J. Revelard who was at that time in charge of the Ruanda-Urundi Demographic Surveys (Endemoru).

[6] Hiernaux, 1956b, pp. 34-53. Cf. Czekanowski, 1917, pp. 122-34. See the interesting photographs in Czekanowski, 1911, plates 1-61 and in Hiernaux, 1956b, plates VI-VII.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

Ruanda. The exception was the place where the royal court happened to be established. At the end of the nineteenth century the most permanent site was Nyanza, which was and still is regarded as the capital. One or two thousand people lived there, but Nyanza was not a village or a town. It was rather the great homestead of the king surrounded by the small temporary dwellings occupied by the different chiefs when they came to the court to pay a more or less long and obligatory visit to their sovereign. The king had other residences throughout the country where he stayed regularly.

Markets do not appear to have been numerous in Ruanda before the European occupation. Goods were exchanged mainly through other channels; the tribute of subject, dues of clients, gifts from the lords, &c. At all events the few markets where goods from abroad, such as rock-salt coming from the Lake Edward region, were exchanged, did not become centres of villages as in many other parts of Africa.

5. HEALTH

The general health of a people is as significant a part of the background of their culture and social institutions as are physical environment or demography. We can only conjecture about the situation before Europeans came, but there is some evidence.

The health of a group of people depends partly on their diet. The present day diet is lacking in animal proteins, vegetable fats (containing vitamins A, D, and E), and green vegetables.[28] We have no reason to believe that there was a higher consumption of meat fifty years ago, or that there were oleaginous plants growing which have disappeared and that the habit of eating green vegetables has been lost. According to nutritionists, these shortcomings cannot be compensated by a consumption, however abundant, of carbohydrates, a high percentage of which is to be found in maize, sorghum, peas, and beans. Also, if a fairly adequate consumption of the latter foodstuffs is possible now (in the sense that the total annual yield for the country is sufficient for the total number of people), it is not to be assumed that the total production was as high fifty years ago as it is now. On the contrary, the figures we have indicate that fifty years ago, the production of maize, sorghum, peas, and beans was much lower than today.

[28] Ministère des Colonies, 1951b, p. 56; Close, 1955.

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

The conditions favouring contamination by different diseases and the very limited defences against them permit us to assume that illness and mortality through these diseases must have been very high and a constant threat to everybody.

These brief notes on health conditions in Ruanda would be incomplete without a mention of mental health. We are not attempting here an assessment of the neuroses and psychoses which can be found in Ruanda or to the number of people affected by them and who, in the Western world, would be considered in need of psychiatric treatment. There is not sufficient information on these matters at present. But we would like to consider very briefly conditions which are likely to result in psychological tensions.

We have already mentioned the circumstances which make life objectively hard (a barely sufficient diet, starvation periods, and diseases). In addition it was often dangerous. When informants were asked what sort of reputation they particularly wished to avoid, they did not usually answer by listing the opposites of those particular qualities which they would like to have attributed to them, but by pointing to some definite reputation in which danger might be inherent. Above all, a Tutsi feared to be regarded as an enemy of the king. It was no doubt partly because he felt a genuine respect for the king, but mainly because to be thought of as an enemy of the king was extremely dangerous. It could mean dispossession of everything, the severance of all social relations, exile, or even death. He also feared to be considered a traitor to his chief. This was a less dangerous reputation, although it entailed sanctions: if a client had been disloyal to his lord the latter might take back from him all the cattle he had previously given him and eventually all his cattle. The Hutu said that they feared an accusation of witchcraft, for such an accusation could certainly mean immediate death. There was little that could be done actively to avoid such a danger except to be a good neighbour, to be envied by nobody, to have no enemies, and especially to have a powerful protector. The Hutu were also afraid of acquiring any reputation which could result in their losing the protection of the lord to whom they owed allegiance and consequently leaving them exposed and defenceless against the arbitrary actions of the powerful.[81]

[81] Cf. Maquet, 1954a, or Maquet, 1958.

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degrees of control exerted by that central authority on the territory. These processes have necessarily had an impact on the autonomy and social significance of Hutu and Tutsi kinship groups, on their connexion with a particular tract of land, and on their functions. We shall not be concerned here with any reconstruction of these processes but only with them as they existed in the immediate pre-European days. It should be borne in mind, however, that this was the period of an evolution. This explains the sometimes confused picture given by some informants.

(*a*) *Inzu, ubwoko, umulyango*

Hutu and Tutsi recognized a patrilineal kin group (*inzu*)[3] which included all who could actually trace their agnatic relationship through usually no more than four or five ascendent genealogical links to an ancestor recognized as the original ancestor of the group.

Members of the inzu of a male Ego were: Br, Si, Fa, FaSi, FaBr, FaBrSo, FaBrDa, FaFa, FaFaBr, FaFaSi, FaFaBrSo, FaFaBrDa, FaFaBrSoSo, FaFaBrSoDa.[4]

Ego's sororal nephews and nieces (SiSo, SiDa) and his paternal cross-cousins (FaSiSo and FaSiDa) did not belong to his *inzu*. However they participated in some of its activities if they lived with their maternal uncle (Ego), which happened when the bride-wealth for their mother (Ego's Si) had not been entirely paid.



Diagram A.

Other generations above Ego's (that of FaFaFa, &c.) or under his (that of SoSoSo, &c.), were not necessarily included in Ego's

[3] *Inzu* means also hut.
[4] I follow the symbolization system used by Murdock, 1949.

9: Maquet E-5 (1949-1951) 1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

for instance with a widow, intercourse took place with a brother or a parallel cousin of the deceased husband.

Among the Hutu when the inzu as such possessed fields (*ingobii* or *ubukonde*), as happened particularly in the northern area (Bugoyi, Mulera, Ndorwa), the individual member had a right to a plot (*isambo*). He could not sell such a plot, but could let it (at a rent of about one hoe for two years). If the ancestor has received cows from a lord (*shebuja*), these cows, or rather their offspring, were the property of the inzu which happened to have some pasture land. Among the Tutsi there were usually no land rights vested in the inzu. Tutsi as well as Hutu inzu had no sacred place other than the ancestor's shrine in the *rugo* (enclosure) of the lineage-head and the small huts in the enclosure of each descendant.

From this one may infer that the lineage group at the end of the nineteenth century was not a group with a territorial basis. It is very likely that a territorial lineage group was common among the Hutu and had persisted in the north where Hutu were predominant and where Tutsi occupation had always been scanty and superficial (there were very few Tutsi settlers in that region, apart from administrative chiefs).[9] On the other hand all the activities of the inzu just described implied a rather close co-residence (which is, of course, different from the concept of a territorial basis). These frequent gatherings, blood-feuds, and the rendering of help in difficult circumstances would hardly have been possible if the members of the group had been living in scattered places several days' journey apart. This explains also the crucial importance of the change of residence in the formation of a new inzu. When a branch of an inzu had to leave and settle elsewhere, it was bound to become a new inzu because the former relations with the members of the inzu who did not move could not have been maintained, at least among the Hutu and ordinary Tutsi. This was less important for Tutsi chiefs who were in any case moving about and travelling frequently.

(c) *Social roles within the inzu*

Following the authors of *Toward a General Theory of Action*, social role is understood here as the totality of reciprocal

[9] For an account of the specific structure of the kinship system in the north of Ruanda, the present-day districts (*territoires*) of Kisenyi, Ruhengeri and part of Biumba, see Hertefelt, 1959.

9:Maquet E-5 (1949-1951)1961 FO42 Rundi FO42

interactions of Ego and Alter once an organized system of interaction between themselves has become stabilized. 'Alter expects Ego to behave in given situational conditions in certain relatively specific ways, or at least within relatively specific limits.'[10]

Members of an inzu were supposed to have more confidence in each other and to be readier to help and sympathize with each other than with outsiders. Within the inzu itself, each member was expected to assume a certain role which defined, within narrow limits, expected behaviour towards other lineage members. Before these intra-inzu roles are described, a list of kinship terms used within the inzu to address or designate members, will be given. Some characteristics of these behaviour patterns are reflected in the terminology, as, for instance, the predominance within the lineage of the horizontal or generation principle of grouping over the vertical grouping by branches of the lineage.

Data will be presented first and implications analysed at a later stage. Our point of reference will be the conventional Ego. All the terms and their symbolizations are to be understood as relating to Ego who is a male (Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa). The same terms are used by a male as by a female, except where otherwise indicated: f.s. (female speaking) and m.s. (male speaking).

Role	*Term of address*	*Term of reference*
I. The generation of Ego's father		
Fa	Data	Data
FaBr	Data	Datawacu (father-our)
FaSi	Mama	Masenge (mother through father)
FaFaBrSo	Data	Datawacu
FaFaBrDa	Mama	Masenge
FaFaFaBrSoSo	Data	Datawacu
FaFaFaBrSoDa	Mama	Masenge
II. The generation of Ego's grandfather		
FaFa	Sogokuru (kuru = great)	Sogokuru
FaFaBr	Sogokuru	Sogokuru
FaFaSi	Nyogokuru	Nyogokuru
FaFaFaBrSo	Sogokuru	Sogokuru
FaFaFaBrDa	Nyogokuru	Nyogokuru
III. The generation of Ego's great-grandfather		
FaFaFa	Sogokuru	Sogokuruza
FaFaFaBr	Sogokuru	Sogokuruza
FaFaFaSi	Nyogokuru	Nyogokuruza

[10] Parsons and Shils, 1951, p. 19.

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partnership among cross-cousins and that this was only one aspect of wider behaviour patterns of familiarity and joking. The relations between Ego and certain of his affines should be understood in the same sense.

These relations were reciprocal in the sense that the husband of Ego's partner was also the privileged partner of Ego's wife, as the two husbands had the same relationships of affinity with each other's wives. This reciprocity seemed essential to the working of the system, which otherwise would have been probably too frustrating. The case of the wife of Ego's wife's brother (WiBrWi) confirms this interpretation. Although she was quite unrelated to Ego, there was a kind of 'incest' taboo concerning any relation with her. There was a strict avoidance (Ego was not allowed to stay alone with his WiBrWi) and such a relation was considered to bring ill-luck not only to the partners but to the lineages concerned. The reason for that prohibition, I was told, was that the husband of WiBrWi, being the brother of Ego's wife, was prevented by the incest-taboo from having any reciprocal relations with her. It appears, however, that the common resentment of Ego and his WiBrWi against their common in-laws may have been such that these sanctions were not a sufficient deterrent.

These different patterns of behaviour were expressed in terminology. Ego referred by the same term to his wife's female parallel cousins and by another to her cross-cousins and male parallel cousins. There was also a special term to designate those who are husbands of privileged partners. A female Ego used terms in which similar distinctions appeared.

5. SOME COMMENTS ON KINSHIP PRINCIPLES IN RUANDA

(a) *Analytical table of kinship terms*

The attention I have given and have still to give to kinship terminology rests on the assumption that the use of kinship terms indicates what aspects, among the many that could be stressed in a kinship system, have been actually emphasized in a particular society. Terminology indicates first the principles according to which, among the almost unlimited mass of possible relationships some have been given a name and are thus considered as social roles. Secondly, terminology shows the lines of cleavage according to which the totality of relationships have been separated in different classes.

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[P. 64]

CHAPTER III

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

1. MARRIAGE

121 59 THE family, the social group characterized by common residence, economic co-operation, and reproduction[1] had in Ruanda a conjugal basis[2] that we shall consider in this section.

Married life will not be dealt with here but only the ways and conditions of the establishment of that 'union between a man and a woman such that children born to the woman are then recogized legitimate offspring of both partners'.[3]

(a) *The choice of a spouse*

589 In a primary marriage (the first that an individual contracts) there were few positive socially recognized criteria of choice and none of them indicated one or a few individuals as preferential partners. Among close kin cross-cousins were possible spouses, but it was generally an unfortunate circumstance that obliged a man to marry his cross-cousin. It was usually either because he was not able to pay bride-wealth immediately, or because his cross-cousin had become pregnant by him. We should add that there was no restricted or generalized exchange among the [114] Ruanda in Lévi-Strauss's sense. On the contrary I was told that because they limited connexions, exchanges were not in favour except in some special circumstances.[4]

In the preceding chapter we have mentioned persons whom Ego was prohibited from marrying because of his relations of kinship or affinity with them. Let me sum up the different categories of these persons.

We may start with that which seems fundamental in the sense

[1] Murdock, 1949, p. 1.
[2] Linton, 1936, p. 159.
[3] Royal Anthropological Institute, 1951, p. 110.
[4] Lévi-Strauss, 1949, pp. 189, 322. There is restricted exchange if, when a man of group A gets a woman from group B, it results in a man of group B claiming a woman from group A. Exchange is generalized if when a woman of group A is given to a man of group B, a woman of B must be given to a man of C and a woman of C may be claimed by a man of A.

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The members of a nuclear family lived in a compound called
594 by the same name, rugo. I have described earlier this complex dwelling place composed of intersecting circular enclosures. In
[592] the case of rich people, their clients during their time of service
[554] and their servants had huts in the compound.

The compound, surrounded by fields and banana-groves, and not far from pastures, was situated on that part of the paternal homestead given by the father to his son at the latter's wedding. If the father's homestead was not large enough to provide all his sons with areas to live on, the young couple either had to ask the political authority to allocate them a plot, or they had to rent one belonging either to a relative or an unrelated person.

595 The ideal type of residence of a polygynous family was a compound for each wife surrounded by its own cultivated area. These rugo could be on the same homestead or on several homesteads. The latter arrangement was more frequent with Tutsi than with Hutu. None of these compounds was more important than the others, except occasionally. The husband had no rugo regarded as being more his residence than the others.

Between these two sharply different types of family organization, there were intermediate kinds. If it happened that a Ruanda wanted a second wife, he looked for one even if he could not afford a second compound. She lived then in the same compound as the first wife, in a separate hut. But such an arrangement was regarded as unfortunate, and should be assimilated to that of a nuclear family notwithstanding the plurality of wives.

●121 We will now consider whether and how these types of organization fulfilled the functions that might be expected of any type of family, for some of these functions seem to be fulfilled by all the family structures known, and the others by most of them. The points to be considered are: sexual gratification, economic cooperation, reproduction, socialization, and ritual.

(a) *Sexual relations*

581 The Ruanda distinguish the sexual from the procreational function of marriage. Neither the husband, nor apparently the wife, ever feared (except in very unhappy circumstances of poverty) that pregnancy might result from any particular act of
[842] intercourse; on the contrary such an event was usually longed for. As some informants said, why have relations with a sterile woman? Sexuality, however, had for them a value in itself.

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CHAPTER V

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

I. DEFINITIONS

121 POLITICAL organization is a sector of the social structure not easy to define.

The phrase, widely used in everyday speech, immediately evokes the idea of government and rulers. That is to say, persons who deal with matters which are important because they concern the group as a whole and consequently the commonweal. Moreover, these persons are authorities, and are powerful; what they have decided will be carried out. Often they enjoy many privileges which they usually attempt to justify and which they try in any event to keep and to increase. Finally, they have relations with their counterparts in other groups: they discuss with them on an equal footing, sometimes they threaten them or are threatened by them and by opposing the forces of their groups they try to settle the dispute to their advantage.

The term 'political' thus suggests to us persons (chiefs, governing bodies), abstract ideas (authority, power), certain kinds of activities (which are called 'public'), a value which should be the aim of the action of the chiefs (the commonweal), the private interests of the rulers, diplomacy, and war. These elements are too numerous and varied for all of them to be included in a useful definition at the beginning of an inquiry.

A distinction must be made between the use of 'political' in an intragroup or intergroup context. Political relations between two groups have a completely different meaning from those existing between people belonging to the same group. Let us begin by an intragroup definition to use in the present inquiry.

(*a*) *Intragroup political organization*

A political organization is the totality of culturally patterned relationships between certain individuals who possess the legitimate use of physical force and all the others who inhabit a certain territory at a certain time.

The first words of this definition, *a totality of relationships*,

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indicate the level of reality we are dealing with. As any social system, political organization is a reality composed of relationships between men. What differentiates each system is how the human actors in the relationship are defined. A kinship system, for instance, is made of relationships between persons defined in terms of descent and siblinghood.

These relationships are *culturally patterned*. Political behaviour is not to be invented. Any well-socialized member of the group knows what is expected of him.

The two actors in a political relation are members of the *same group* which has a *territorial* basis. We follow here the majority of sociologists for whom a political organization must be linked to a territory. This certainly seems a necessary condition for the use of physical force, an essential part of the definition. As men are situated in space, it would not be possible for their rulers to inflict on them a physical coercion, or at least to threaten them effectively with it, if the rulers had not the control of a certain area where those who are to be submitted to pressure live. The *time* dimension is added. Indeed it is not necessary that the group inhabits always the same territory. For instance, nomads moving each season to new grazing land do not have a constant territorial basis, but they have a territory in the sense that their group has at any time the ultimate control of a certain area, even if that area is different every day.

Among members of the same group, what distinguishes the political relationship from others is that one of the actors possesses the legitimate use of *physical force*. This element of coercion has been stressed by many sociologists and anthropologists. For Oppenheimer, the origin of the state lies in the force used in conquest.[1] Max Weber speaks of 'that human association which within a definite sphere . . . successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical force'.[2] Lowie writes that 'the state embraces the inhabitants of a definite area who acknowledge the legitimacy of force when applied by individuals whom they accept as rulers or governors'.[3] Radcliffe-Brown, too, emphasizes the physical force component of a political organization: '. . . the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force'.[4] MacIver and Page regard coercion or

[1] See Oppenheimer, 1922. [2] Quoted by Lowie, 1948, p. 156.
[3] Lowie, 1948, p. 317.
[4] Radcliffe-Brown in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. xiv.

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121 the threat of it as characteristic of the political law.[5] Such quotations can be easily multiplied.

It could be objected that some of the authors quoted above deal with the state rather than with political organization in general. The two terms are used here almost as synonyms. The only difference is that the word 'state' implies a greater emphasis on the stability and the permanence of the group which has the capacity to exert physical coercion.

Those in the dominant situation will be called rulers, superiors; the others, subjects, inferiors.

It is not necessary that compulsion be applied; it is sufficient that it could be made effective.

The term *legitimate* has no Western moral connotation here. It only means that the group regards physical coercion as a proper reaction when coming from some individuals. If it is admitted in a particular society that the chief has the right of life and death over all his subjects whether they have committed an offence or not, the suppression of anybody when ordered by the chief is legitimate. But when a thief steals valuables from somebody under the threat of harming him, the victim, in our society and probably in any other, is regarded as having been submitted to illegitimate coercion.

The preceding definition mentions neither the explicit aim nor the function of that totality of culturally patterned relationships. In his definition, Radcliffe-Brown includes the function of political organization which is, according to him, 'the maintenance or the establishment of social order'.[6] Herskovits mentions 'the regulation of affairs that concern the group as a whole'.[7] Indeed a functional definition is intellectually more satisfactory. But it should follow an analysis and not precede it. It is true that in any society certain social functions must be fulfilled if the group is to subsist and perpetuate itself (there must be a means to collect food, to distribute it, to obtain the security necessary to raise and educate children, &c.), and other functions may be fulfilled (such as the provision of the individual with certain comforts in the difficulties of life, with a world-view, &c.). But in spite of several attempts,[8] no satisfactory exclusive connexions have been established between these different functions and particular institutions

[5] Cf. MacIver and Page, 1949, p. 436.
[6] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. xiv. [7] Herskovits, 1948, p. 327.
[8] For instance, Malinowski, 1931, p. 645; 1944, pp. 91 f, pp. 125 f.

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which fulfil them. As we have seen previously, the Ruanda family organization had several functions (sexual, economic, reproductive, educational, ritual), some of which also belong elsewhere to other institutions. The same institution, religion for instance, may be a factor of social cohesion in one society, yet it may break the unity of another. Moreover, the same structure may have functions varying with time as the modern state which directly takes care of the welfare and health of the people living in its territory.

Consequently it seems better to distinguish clearly a social structure from the functions it may fulfil. By analysing an institution in a particular social context, we shall be able to determine what are its functions in the particular society studied.

(*b*) *Power*

Frequently what is political is identified with what concerns power. Lasswell has listed a series of social values and a series of institutions through which these values are formalized and shared among the members of a group. He indicates 'government' as the institution corresponding to 'power'.[9] This means that the political organization is the network through which power is distributed within a group. This conception does not seem to fit with Lasswell's own notion of power (which I entirely accept)—an interpersonal situation in which a severe deprivation may be inflicted by one person on another[10]—according to which power relations should be considered a *genus* of which a political relation is a *species*. Political relation is indeed power relation: to exert physical coercion against somebody, even if it is legitimate, is surely a way of inflicting severe deprivation on him. But all power relations are not necessarily political. An employer may threaten his employee to dispossess him of his livelihood. This is a power relation but it is not political.

(*c*) *Social power*

Another sort of power to be distinguished from political power is *social power*. It is an interpersonal relationship in which each of the human actors belongs to a different group or stratum of the same society; because of these different affiliations only, one person is able to exert pressure on the other.

[9] Lasswell, 1948, p. 17.
[10] Lasswell, 1948, pp. 10-14. See also Russell, 1938, pp. 35 f.

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(*d*) *Intergroup political relations*

121 Intergroup political relations are essentially different. They do not imply inferiority and superiority. The opposite assumption is made: the two groups are supposed to be independent and equal. If by diplomacy or by war one succeeds in subduing the other, the subsequent unequal relations will be more similar to intragroup than to intergroup political relations.

If our definition of intragroup political organization be accepted, the word 'political' when applied to intergroup relations conveys a different and derivative meaning. Those who control legitimate coercion within a social structure are also those who are qualified to enter into intergroup relations. Subjects do not represent their own group, only rulers do. The ability to deal with intergroup relations results from a superior situation in internal political relations. In that sense, the political external relations may be said to be secondary. In the following account of Ruanda political organization the emphasis will be on the primary political relations, the internal ones.

• • •

C42 511 In Ruanda, there were two types of relationships sanctioned by legitimate coercion on the part of the superior. Consequently we may distinguish within the political organization two structures which may be termed administrative and military. Another system of social relations was the clientage structure or the feudal organization. It occupied an intermediate position between the political and the private spheres. It was not purely political, but it was much more than a private agreement such as a loan. Consequently the feudal relations in Ruanda will be considered in close connexion with the administrative and military ones.

[183] C41 The three structures were interwoven and interconnected at each level. This was particularly the case at the top and at the bottom. The mwami held the supreme position in the three systems and the commoners were taxpayers, members of an army, and clients. In the intermediate levels it happened, too, that a superior and an inferior were linked by several ties: one could be at the same time the lord and the cattle-chief of an individual, and the client of one's army chief.

I shall describe and analyse each structure separately.

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To provide the central government with regular revenues, to maintain its predominant and privileged situation, and to favour social cohesion, were the functions of the administrative structure. Moreover, as any authority in Ruanda, the land-chief was judge in the disputes concerning rights over land. The cattle-chief, however, had no judicial capacity because disputes about cattle were dealt with by the army-chief.

Impositions and taxes exist in all societies which have a centralized organization of political power. Rulers to maintain their dominant position need to be able to dispose of great revenues. The more centralized a government is, the larger is the amount of goods needed because the administrative officers are numerous.[13]

This political necessity of taxation has been justified differently according to the ideology of each culture.[14] Thus in modern democratic states, taxes are said to be the contribution of each citizen to the maintenance of services used by all members of the community, such as roads open to everybody, a police force which protects property and life against internal dangers, courts and tribunals for those who feel that they have been wronged and want to obtain reparation, an army which protects the community against an external threat, &c.

In Ruanda, tributes in labour and goods to the mwami were justified by the nature of the royal power. Kingship was divine. The first king of Ruanda, Nkuba (which means lightning), lived in heaven with his wife Nyagasani, their two sons Kigwa and Mututsi, and their daughter, Nyampundu. One day the three siblings fell from heaven and settled on a Ruanda hill. There Kigwa married his sister. Their descendents constituted the Abanyiginya clan. Mututsi, Kigwa's brother, married one of his nieces. Their descendents were the Abega. The two royal clans (usually the Abanyiginya married Abega girls) had thus a divine origin.[15] From this godlike nature of the mwami followed the justification of his absolute power and of the sovereignty of his rights over the people, the cattle, and the land of Ruanda. By virtue of that divine sovereignty, the king could require tribute. Because everything and everybody was his, he could confiscate any cattle or agricultural produce, and take the labour or even the life of anybody.

This was the theory. In fact the mwami did not use his prerogatives more than the rulers who were not divine but had the same means

[13] Maquet, 1952. [14] Maquet, 1954c, p. 65. [15] See Pagès, 1933, p. 491.

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The Ruanda military structure appears thus to have been in its warlike role an organization for conquering and looting rather than for defence. But this warlike function was not its only one and perhaps not the most important in the appreciation of many Ruanda. Whereas almost all our informants (ninety-eight per cent.) still remember the name of the army in which their inzu had been incorporated first, only a smaller proportion is able to remember certain features concerning exclusively the warlike life. Only sixty-eight per cent. still know that *abakoni* were warriors whose task was to lay hold of cattle during the battle, sixty-nine per cent. that *umudende* was a badge of honour given to those who had killed seven enemies during a campaign; just fourteen per cent. can define *impotore* as the distinction granted to those who had killed fourteen enemies and merely eleven per cent. remember that *gucana uruti* (to burn the spears) was a ceremonial to honour warriors who had killed twenty-one enemies during an expedition. This less extensive knowledge of purely warlike aspects of the army is not to be accounted for merely by the fact that one does not organize raids now and that an opportunity to kill twenty-one enemies during an expedition does not arise frequently. As the whole military structure, even in its well-remembered aspects, became obsolete at about the same time as wars, the relatively poor knowledge of its warlike features suggests that the other functions of the armies were felt to be very important.

(*b*) *Socialization*

Every society is much concerned with socializing or 'enculturalizing'[20] the younger generation. Ways of life, common abilities, values, and beliefs of the group have to be inculcated into children in order to make them efficient and conforming participants of their own culture.

In Ruanda this process of socialization was formalized for Tutsi young men. During the years they spent at the court of the king or of a chief, they were systematically given education and instruction. Education is that part of a socialization process which aims at transmitting the bulk of knowledge and behaviour expected from any well-adjusted member of a group. Young Tutsi were taught the traditional sports and dances becoming to young noblemen, they were trained in poetry and the ability to carry on an eloquent and witty conversation. The great traditions of military

[20] Herskovits, 1948, pp. 33 ff.

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relationship which should be enjoyed by both parties according to the classical definition of contract.

A third way in which *buhake* was different from the Western conception of contract lay in the vagueness and uncertainty in the measure of the reciprocal obligations. The patron could be more or less generous in the number of cows he granted, more or less exacting in the services he required; the client could be more or less prompt and zealous in his service. If there was a dispute about these differences in the execution of the agreement, there was no charter one could refer to for an assessment of rights and duties.

(*b*) *Caste structure*

To understand the functions of the feudal system in Ruanda society, one must first clarify some important features of that society.

As our descriptions and analysis of Ruanda proceed, it becomes more and more certain that there was there a caste structure or something very similar to it. Sociologists usually define a caste society as one composed of several graded groups, each of which is endogamous and practising an hereditary occupation, membership of which can be obtained only by birth.[7]

Birth was, indeed, the usual way in which one became a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. This does not mean that the three strata were 'racial' units, but that an individual was a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa when his father was a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. In the same way was his father a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa. But in order to avoid such expressions, which could go on *ad infinitum*, a definition other than an hereditary one should be found. But it does not seem that there is any other than that a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa is a person who regarded himself, and was regarded by all those who knew him, as a Tutsi, a Hutu or a Twa, the usual way for a person to fulfil this social definition being to realize the hereditary one. In some cases, however, it was possible to be socially recognized as a Tutsi without having been begotten by a Tutsi father. For instance a Twa who had been ennobled or the son of a rich Hutu cattle owner and of a Tutsi woman, was sometimes regarded as a Tutsi. But these were exceptional cases and we may say that the caste criterion of membership by birth held in general for all the three Ruanda groups.

The same may be said of the criterion of endogamy. We saw

[7] Cf. Lowie, 1948, pp. 10, 273.

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The same may be said of the criterion of endogamy. We saw
564 previously that marriages between Hutu and Tutsi were not
[580] banned but that they were neither favoured nor frequent. Marriages between Twa and the two other groups were prohibited.

Since cattle rearing, agriculture, and hunting, with pot making, were the main activities characteristic of our three strata, the criterion of hereditary occupation was certainly realized in Ruanda.

The fourth criterion, the hierarchy of the groups within the society, was certainly to be seen in Ruanda. We must, however, consider more closely what kind of ranking existed between the castes.

121 Social power has been previously defined as an interpersonal relation in which each of the human actors, because he belongs to a different group or stratum of the same society, is able to exert pressure on the other. One occupies a position of power over somebody, not because of personal qualities or the specific social role one fulfils or one's wealth, but only because one is a member of a certain group. The two human terms of the relation do not stand on their own personal merits but as representatives of their groups. Personal characteristics do not matter, only the identification with a group.

This notion of social power which operates in interpersonal relations is based on social power regarded from the collective point of view. Collectively, social power is the intergroup relation in which one of the two groups may inflict on the other a severe loss. It is the pressure exerted by one group as such on another.

564 The three Ruanda castes were in a hierarchic order, then, from the standpoint of social power, both collective and individual. The Tutsi caste could as a group inflict severe deprivations on the Hutu or Twa castes, and any individual Tutsi could exert strong pressure on any Hutu or Twa irrespective of their personal qualities and possessions.

Let us now turn to the function of the feudal system in Ruanda.

(c) Protection by identification

121 To live in a society where several castes very unequal in their social power coexist, frequently puts the individuals of the weaker groups in a very difficult position. Indeed, anybody may be at any time confronted with an exacting demand made on him by somebody possessing higher social power. To be protected against such

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a demand, it is indispensable for the person submitted to it to increase his own social power. It is impossible to do this directly as he cannot, except very rarely, enter into the upper caste, but he may obtain it indirectly by succeeding in identifying himself with a person endowed with great social power. Feudality is an institutionalization of that identification of an individual socially weak, with another, socially powerful, who secures for the former the necessary protection against other socially powerful individuals.

Is it not possible, in a caste society, to protect the persons enjoying little social power by other means than a clientage system?

The political power of the superior group could be limited by preventing that group from using the pressure of legitimate physical force. For instance, it could be made illegal for a person of the upper group to force somebody to work for him under the threat of having him imprisoned or beaten if he refused. This solution was aimed at in the nineteenth-century Western liberal state. There the groups were not castes but classes, defined both by amount of wealth and the type of its usage (capital investment versus consumer goods buying). The difference between classes and castes is irrelevant at this stage of our argument. According to its Marxist critics, that solution has not succeeded in preventing the domination of the economically weak group by the economically powerful one. If, they said, a rich man is not allowed to force another one to work for him under the threat of police, he may force him as effectively by the threat of taking his livelihood from him. Consequently, the Marxists proposed another solution to make the economic power of all individuals equal.

It is clear that both solutions attempt to solve the problem of the protection of socially weak individuals by changing the hierarchic structure of the society. In the liberal solution the dominant group is stripped of its political privileges, which makes it weaker as a superior group; in the Marxist solution, it is deprived of its preponderant social power, and completely disappears. It seems that a clientage institution is the only means permitting the protection of socially weak individuals without destroying the unequal participation of the groups in social power. In that system the groups continue to be endowed with an unequal collective social power, whereas the range of variability in individual social power

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is made narrower in order to give everybody the opportunity of obtaining sufficient personal security.

Such was, it appears, the first function of the *buhake* system in Ruanda. In that society where it was advisable to go into court accompanied by socially powerful persons, and when a Hutu possessing some wealth but no protector was risking the loss of his possessions, the feudal organization, by institutionalizing the identification of the Hutu client with the Tutsi lord, secured the necessary protection and security for the socially weak. With a few exceptions, the Twa were outside that feudal system. Their caste occupations were not compatible with cattle-rearing and made available to them other means of obtaining the personal protection of upper caste people. On the other hand, their small number made that kind of protection very effective.

(*d*) *Social cohesion*

A second function of the feudality in Ruanda was its contribution to the cohesion of the society.

In this respect we have to distinguish the feudal agreements in which clients were Hutu from those in which they were Tutsi. Let us first take the former. In order that two castes whose interests were so often divergent or opposed could constitute a stable unitary structure, it was necessary that they should not remain merely juxtaposed but should show some solidarity. Through the feudal relations economic currents flowed between Hutu and Tutsi: the land tillers had at their disposal some cattle; the pastoralists consumed agricultural produce and had fields cultivated by their servants and clients. In this way the economic system of production in Ruanda was mixed, made up of techniques, abilities, and wealth brought by the two groups. Through *buhake*, Hutu participated in the Tutsi values. They valued cattle very highly and entered the prestige system based on bovine possession. They assimilated some Tutsi alimentary habits, such as drinking milk. Feudality proved a very effective instrument for the constitution of a culture common to all Ruanda.

When there was a feudal agreement between two Tutsi, the *buhake* had another relevance to social cohesion. It may be said that any Tutsi client was also a lord and any Tutsi lord was also a client. The mwami was the only patron who was nobody's client. His *ganga* were the great Tutsi chiefs, the lords of less important

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Tutsi, who themselves were patrons of still less important Tutsi, and so on. In this way the Tutsi consituted a homogeneous unit of individuals linked to one another by bonds of fidelity and protection. From that point of view, *buhake* contributed to the unity and the solidarity of the aristocratic caste.

(e) Maintenance of caste privileges

Besides the protection of socially weak individuals and the promotion of social cohesion, a third function was fulfilled by the feudal system: the maintenance of the social *status quo* and the perpetuation of Tutsi privileges. This function seems somewhat opposed to the first two. Let us see how all these functions have been combined by the *buhake* system.

In a stratified society where control of a category of goods or a type of ownership is characteristic of the superior layer, the access of the members of other groups to these goods or to the particular rights of ownership constitutes an active factor of social mobility. It is the reason why the aristocracy frequently keeps exclusively for itself these goods and these rights. Thus in Ankole the Hima pastoralists bar Iru cultivators from the ownership of productive cows. They may possess only barren cows and bull calves.[8]

Ruanda Tutsi did not impose such severe rules but by the *buhake* system they obtained very much the same results. They allowed Hutu to have cattle at their disposal—which in exchange provided Tutsi with labour and agricultural produce—but at the same time prevented them from gaining independent ownership rights over these cattle. Those who had the final control of cattle were always Tutsi. As the Hutu had been granted only usufruct rights over cattle which were different from those enjoyed by the lords who were Tutsi, there was no chance that the group of cattle owners could be invaded by Hutu.

By definition the client's possession was precarious. This uncertainty in the duration of the disposal of cattle was further emphasized by the circumstances mentioned above. The breaking off of the *buhake* relation was almost always favourable mainly to the lord and could often be disastrous for the client. It may even be said that when the practice of merging the *buhake* cows (*inkazi-biti*) with the cows not received from a lord (*imbata*) was regarded as customary, all the Hutu cattle were precariously held and under

[8] Oberg, 1940, p. 130.

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CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI DOMINATION

At the beginning of this century, after an historical development of which we can at the most have only a glimpse, Ruanda society appeared to be composed of two main strata, the Hutu and Tutsi castes. The latter was dominant in social power and used it to exploit economically the former and to retain political power exclusively.

This system of the social domination of a caste and of the political domination of a group within that caste seemed to be successful and stable at the beginning of the twentieth century. How did the Tutsi achieve the difficult task of keeping such a large caste kingdom a working concern? Before considering the social structural factors which were operative one must take into account the frame in which and the background against which the problem of domination had to be solved. By frame and background, is understood here the totality of circumstances which appeared to the Tutsi, and were for them, unalterable. Tutsi had to adapt their pattern of domination to these circumstances as they were in any event beyond their control. These circumstances were very numerous, pertaining to physical environment (ecological), to human biology, and even to the culture of the group. What these very various elements had in common was that, at the time referred to in this study, they set limits to the action and ways of life of the group. Some of these limits were not immutable in themselves but they were so none the less for the Tutsi at the beginning of the twentieth century.

From this vast congeries of natural, biological, and cultural factors, I shall review only a few which appear most significant from the present point of view: that of the conditions of domination.

1. FRAME AND BACKGROUND OF THE DOMINATION SYSTEM

A first relevant background fact was that, apart from the ultimate control of a most valuable resource, namely, cattle (a subject which will be discussed later), the difference between the equipment of Tutsi and Hutu was not very considerable. It is

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CHAPTER VIII

THE PREMISE OF INEQUALITY

1. DEFINITIONS

121 114 THERE is in a culture much more than can be observed (artifacts, behaviour) or known by direct questions (myths, religious beliefs, &c.). There are conceptions concerning the place of man in the world, his destiny, his main values, his attitudes to his fellow men, the meaning of the invisible world, &c. That covert part of a culture is partly or totally implicit in the sense that these fundamental conceptions and values remain for the culture bearers unexpressed or even unconscious. They are thus reached by induction, some by immediate inference from observation, some by a process encompassing several states of abstraction.

Some elements of the covert culture are particularly fundamental because they underline different cultural phenomena which hitherto might have appeared unrelated. They act as a principle in the logical order from which a set of conclusions may be deduced. This is why the word 'premise' has been preferred here to others such as 'configuration',[1] 'sanction',[2] and 'theme'.[3]

On the other hand, the word 'premise' should not be thought to imply that the relationships between the cultural principle and its cultural consequences obey the strictest laws of rational logic. This relationship may be said to be logical only in a very broad sense. Or more accurately, we must clearly distinguish between 'logical' and 'rational'. There are relationships which are meaningful although they express a sequence which is emotional or 'psychological' or even unconscious rather than rational. Such relationships, however, may be said to be 'logical' in the sense in which we speak of a logic of sentiments or emotions. This simply means that we expect them, 'understand' them.[4]

114 To make the point clear, let us take an example of a logical but not rational relationship between two social phenomena. In the past, a positive correlation has been noted between low economic

[1] Kluckhohn, 1941, 1943.
[2] Opler, 1945.
[3] Herskovits, 1948, pp. 222 f.
[4] Maquet, 1951, p. 165.

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indices and the lynching of Negroes in the Southern States of the Union. There is evidently no rational means for the whites of the south to impute the responsibility for the lack of rain—which was then the cause of the poor cotton crops—to Negroes. This typically irrational behaviour, however, becomes comprehensible if we accept the frustration-aggression sequence. In this sense, it can be said that the relation between the two phenomena, economic crises and lynching, is a logical relation.[5]

Ruanda political relations disclose one of the premises of that culture. Underlying the political and feudal structures there was a general assumption about human relations. In order to formulate it as accurately as may be possible, I shall first consider more closely the social roles of the superior and inferior in the field of political and feudal relations. In the following section the words 'ruler' and 'subject' refer to superiors and inferiors in the administrative, military, and clientage structures.

2. THE RULER'S AND SUBJECT'S SOCIAL ROLES

The analysis of the political organization of Ruanda indicates that the ruler was expected to assume a complex role towards his subject. The two poles of it were protection and profit. The subordinate was somebody whom one protected: he was also a resource from which it was normal to draw some advantage.

Protection was not restricted to a certain field of action, but potentially encompassed the whole of the subject's life. When the inferior needed some help, any help, he was expected to apply to his ruler even if the issue was completely alien to the sphere of the main relations between the ruler and the subject. A client could ask his *shebuja* for aid in matters not pertaining to cattle and *buhake* services. It was even thought proper for the ruler to interfere in difficulties which his subject through his own misdemeanour had run into as, for instance, when an inferior had been caught stealing from somebody. When protection was refused, it was not because the question was not the ruler's concern, but on other grounds, such as disloyalty.

The extent of that protection was not strictly defined. It did not constitute for the ruler a set of particular and fixed obligations. The subordinate had a general right to be protected but very few claims to particular advantages. In *buhake*, when one offered one's

[5] Dollard, 1939, p. 44 (quoted by Maquet, 1951, p. 166).

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point of agreeing with all his opinions, a similar attitude tends to spread to other fields. Each time there is a conflict between what is useful to the speaker or expected from him and what he thinks, he is apt to say rather what is useful or expected.

Thus a dependent attitude in hierarchical relationships favours the extension to all social relations of a utilitarian usage of language.

5. ORIGIN OF THE INEQUALITY PREMISE

We have read the premise, as it were, into the Ruanda political and feudal organization. But this does not solve the question of their mutual priority. Had the political organization of Ruanda, as it existed at the beginning of this century, been built in order to express a belief deeply buried in the psyche of those who have slowly formed and shaped it? Or, on the contrary, is it that the premise of inequality and its sequels have been evolved from the political organization as an ideology and a set of attitudes which fitted the political situation well?

To raise such a question is certainly legitimate in the sense that it expresses a genuine problem which, if it could be solved, would add significantly to our knowledge of the working of social systems and of cultural premises. But there are certain facts crucial to the solution of that question that we are not likely ever to know, such as a good knowledge of the Tutsi culture and its premises before the pastoralists reached Ruanda. It seems possible, however, to make some comments on this problem.

Tutsi came into Ruanda as conquerors. Even if their arrival into the country inhabited by Hutu looked rather like a peaceful infiltration, it was nevertheless a conquest. They wanted to settle in the country and they built a permanent system of economic and political relations with the Hutu whereby they established themselves definitely as masters and exploiters. That is to say, a caste society evolved from their will to stabilize the conquest situation with all its advantages. Now, the more obvious rationalization of a caste structure is the belief that there are inborn and fundamental differences between the members of different castes.

This is not meant to be a schematic view of the historical origin of the Ruanda inequality premise. It is possible that Tutsi had previously to their arrival in Ruanda such a belief, perhaps already embodied in their social organization, or in their external relations with surrounding peoples, and that quite naturally they

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shaped the new Ruanda situation according to their ideology. Again, it is possible that some themes and types of organization of the Hutu cultivators were particularly capable of being used in the formation of the Ruanda ethos as I have described it. But a conquest evolving into a caste structure is sufficient to account for an inegalitarian premise. Even if prior to the conquest each of the two groups concerned has an egalitarian ideology, the establishment of hereditary groups, whereby the status of vanquishers and vanquished is perpetuated, suffices to give birth to a theory of inequality.

I am of the opinion that such a theory is a necessary 'superstructure' (in the Marxist sense) of a caste system. Undoubtedly, a body of inheritance laws, opportunities for a certain kind of education restricted to the wealthiest, a difference in languages, &c., may maintain for some time a high social power in the hands of the conquerors' descendents, even if the cultural ideology is that all men are born equal. But such a lack of internal coherence ('all men are born equal' versus 'political and economic power is restricted to those who are descendants of the conquerors') is very likely to result rapidly in an evolution from a caste system to a class society. A 'racial' theory seems the only ideology perfectly consistent with a caste structure. It is very probable that conquerors adopt it not only for consistency's sake, but because it is more efficient, more easily understood and accepted, particularly when different physical traits are characteristic of each caste.

It should be understood that when we speak of 'the adoption of an ideology by the conquerors', it is not meant that one day the conquerors made a conscious choice among various possible ideologies. Rather, once a caste system operates, the patterns of political domination and of economic exploitation require people to behave as if the upper caste members were by nature different from that of the lower caste members. When the 'idea behind' these behaviours is made more or less explicit, as in tales and proverbs, it is rationalized in terms of fundamental and inborn inequality.

If there is such a necessary link between caste systems and the premise of inequality, then to know whether the conqueror's ideology, prior to the conquest, was egalitarian or not is only an historical question; when the vanquisher settles and establishes a caste system, the inegalitarian ideology is produced, as its corollary.

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The question of the previous premise of the conquerors' culture, however, remains very important in another connexion: to what extent does an anterior egalitarian ideology deter the conquerors from establishing a caste system? Is the conqueror, if imbued with an ethos of egalitarianism, inclined to admit that his principles are valid also in his relations with the vanquished group? Or does he think that obviously the conquered groups are different people? Because of our ignorance of the Tutsi cultural premises before they entered into Ruanda, these questions have to be left unanswered in the case of ancient Ruanda.

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Women of Burundi: A Study of Social Values

[9]For the most part, what is here said of Burundi was true also of the people of the neighbouring kingdom of Ruanda. Significant differences will be footnoted. For the hierarchical principle in Ruanda, see: J. J. Maquet, *Le Système des Relations sociales dans le Ruanda ancien*, Annales du Musée Royal du Congo Belge, Tervuren (Belgique), Sciences de l'Homme, Ethnologie, vol. I, 1954.

[3]Burundi is changing its laws. Thus, women and other social inferiors increasingly enjoy legal privileges and rights.

[4]In Ruanda, the queen-mother shared the royal power with her son, the *mwami*. This was not the case in Burundi.

[5]Very little will be said about religion in Burundi. The cult of Kiranga, the ancestor cult, and every other aspect of traditional religion and belief have been legally suppressed. About one-third of the population have been converted to Christianity. Religion, traditional and contemporary, is always important in the life of a society, but it may be concluded from the behaviour, the interests and the values of the Rundi that their society is secular rather than sacred.

[6]The word "caste" is not entirely satisfactory for describing the social distinctions of Burundi. However, there does not seem to be any better translation for the term, *aboko*, which connotes racial differences and to which are attached taboos and marriage regulations which separate rather rigidly these divisions of Rundi society.

[7]Although the terms "Hamitic" and "Bantu" are, properly speaking, linguistic terms, they will be used here, for lack of anything better, in their common acceptation as referring to social-cultural groups.

[8]In Ruanda, the Twa are more respected than the Hutu. Moreover, caste distinctions in Ruanda are social rather than racial. *Cf.* J. J. Maquet, *op. cit.*

[9]When the *mwami* of Ruanda gave a Tutsi wife to a man of an inferior caste, he raised the man to the higher caste.

[10]*Cf.* Jean Hiernaux, *Analyse de la Variation des Caractères physiques humains en une Région de l'Afrique centrale: Ruanda-Urundi et Kivu.* Annales du Musée Royal du Congo Belge, Tervuren (Belgique), Sciences de l'Homme, Anthropologie, vol. 3, 1956.

[11]Since 1952, polygamy is no longer permitted. Nevertheless, there are still a good many plural marriages. In the past, a prince might easily have had 20 wives. The average Rundi, however, would not have been wealthy enough to pay for more than two or three.

[12]These taboos are not known in Ruanda.

[13]The Hutu husband is obliged to build and to make repairs on the house, to take care of the banana grove that encircles the homestead, and to brew banana beer.

[14]In the past, there was only one harvest each year. There are now two, but the second one is relatively light.

[15]Almost nothing is known about the Twa, except that the men go to the marshes for the clay needed by the women to make pots and then sell them. The work in the fields is done by the women, but it appears that the men are often home and help.

[16]It has been suggested that anæmia explains the physiological condition interpreted by the Rundi as a prolonged pregnancy.

[17]Blinded by the ideas of my own culture about men's interest in their children's paternity, I wasted a great deal of time in the field seeking confirmation from Hutu and Tutsi, the Europeanized and the traditional. I was finally convinced of the lack of interest in biological paternity. This is, in any case, in keeping with the rather liberal rules pertaining to sexual relations in the kinship system.

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